The orientation of a country's fi nancial system to banks or markets is a fundamental characteristic of the system, and it has important implications. Orientation may infl uence the access that different types of industries have to fi nancing and, as a result, affect economic growth. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (2001) suggest that bank fi nancing is more suitable for physical industries that are well understood, in contrast to more technology-oriented industries, which benefi t more from market fi nancing due to the high levels of uncertainty that characterize such fi rms. Bank-oriented systems are considered better at fi nancing smaller companies and companies that traditionally have high levels of tangible assets, while markets-oriented systems are considered better at fi nancing larger, innovative, faster-growing, and lowtangible-asset companies.
It is also easier for governments to direct capital allocation in a bank-oriented system, while markets-oriented systems direct capital to its best (highest-return) uses. In terms of system stability, bank-oriented systems are more prone to crony capitalism and episodes of unsustainably high levels of bad loans, while markets-oriented systems are prone to speculative bubbles. A given fi nancial system may be more prone to fi nancial crises and another may better promote economic growth. Number 2016 -04 May 11, 2016 ISSN 0428-1276
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National Preferences for Bank or Market Financing
Raj Aggarwal and John W. Goodell This article examines the reasons some countries favor bank-based fi nancial systems and others favor marketsbased fi nancial systems. We show that when societies are more accepting of ambiguity-and by extension are more trusting-market fi nancing is favored over relationship-based collateral fi nancing by banks.
required could be associated with many factors. Industrial structure, legal traditions, political structure, regulatory quality, and economic inequality are some that have been identifi ed (Guizo, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004) .
For example, when a society's contract enforcement regime is not adequate, bank fi nancing is favored, and the binding of transactions shifts to being more private, away from the public eye, via long-term relationships with banks. Banks are also favored when reliable market signals and other information about fi rms are too diffi cult or costly for the public to obtain-for example, if accounting standards are weak. By contrast, when there is a good legal environment and governance, market signals are better able to provide this sort of information to public investors, and markets-oriented systems are preferred.
We argue that the level of reconciliation required also depends on national culture, specifi cally, the society's level of social trust and ethical norms. 1 National culture has been defi ned by Hofstede (1980) as the norms and values that guide behavior and beliefs, the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another. Other scholars describe "subjective culture" as a society's "characteristic way of perceiving its social environment" (Triandis, 1972) . Another way to think about culture is that culture is to society what memory is to individuals (Kluckhohn, 1954) . This can include conscious memory as well as, more ubiquitously, subconscious memory of how to do things and how to behave. More succinctly, Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) conclude that culture is a subset of institutions related to societal collective identity, and behavioral and ideational structures that are the formation of the identity of a community. Thus, culture includes unstated assumptions and habits regarding how people actually behave-particularly with respect to how information is processed.
One such cultural norm is the avoidance of uncertainty, defi ned as the extent to which people in a country do not like uncertainty or ambiguity. Hofstede (1980) measured uncertainty avoidance in a wide array of countries and found that it varied widely. We surmise that uncertainty avoidance is likely to play a role in a society's preference for a markets-or bank-oriented fi nancial system. People with greater tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty are more likely to place a higher priority on their country's legal and regulatory quality when deciding whether to trust in the type of contracts that are the basis of market fi nancing.
In fi gure 1, we plot various nations' tendencies toward a fi nancial architecture (the ratio of stock-market fi nancing to bank fi nancing) against their degree of uncertainty avoidance (UCA). We see a clear negative association between a markets-based fi nancial architecture and uncertainty avoidance. When societies are more accepting of ambiguity-and by extension are more trusting-market fi nancing is favored over relationship-based bank fi nancing. For example, the US and the UK, with UCAs of 46 and 35, respectively, have a Insight into the factors underpinning why nations develop one type of fi nancing system over another is important to policymakers. Until we understand the soil from which these fi nancial systems spring, regulating or reforming either type of system could be diffi cult, ineffective, or even counterproductive.
Finance, Information, and Contracts
Because a fi nancing contract transfers the control of savers' funds to borrowers, savers need some assurance that the funds will be managed properly and that the contract terms can be enforced. That assurance is inherently diffi cult to provide. For one thing, all the parties to the contract have access to different information. They are also motivated by different incentives. It is unfeasible to monitor every decision and event affecting the outcome of the agreement. In the end, it is impossible to specify in a contract all the possible contingencies that might arise; in this sense, all optimal contracts are "incomplete."
Consequently, two mechanisms have evolved to solve the fi nancial intermediation problems associated with incomplete fi nancing contracts, fi nancial institutions and fi nancial markets. Both mechanisms must perform the essential functions involved in fi nancial intermediation, namely, collecting deposits, selecting recipients for the funds, designing the fi nancing contracts, monitoring recipients, and collecting returns from the fi nancing activity. In fact, institutions and markets usually coexist in each country and are both complementary and competing channels for fi nancing economic activity.
Bank-oriented systems rely on relationships to enforce fi nancing contracts. For example, in Japan, banks provide the lion's share of capital to businesses through their integration in business networks ("keiretsu"). Being part of such a network gives banks access to information about the profi tability and other fi nancial details of the fi rms that are part of the network. For entities outside the network-other banks, investors, or the public in general-such information is more costly to obtain. By contrast, investors and savers in markets-based systems expect contracts to be enforced by means of effi cient investor protection laws that are effectively enforced. In addition, greater disclosure levels, business expectations, business behavior, and reputational concerns further strengthen enforcement of contracts in a markets-based fi nancial system.
Culture and Financing
In a theoretically ideal fi nancial system, it makes no difference whether fi nancing is privately done through banks or publicly done through markets. In practice, countries tend toward one or the other, and researchers have found that the direction in which they tend is associated with various characteristics of their society.
Our recent research investigated a number of these characteristics. As no contract can specify all possible contingencies, some ambiguity always exists in contract enforcement, and some societies may naturally demand more reconciliation of these ambiguities than others. The level of reconciliation low need to avoid uncertainty and so rely more on market fi nancing than Germany or Japan, which have a higher need for avoiding uncertainty, with UCAs of 65 and 92.
Other related research has reported results for other variables that may infl uence the national predilection for bank-versus markets-oriented fi nancing systems (Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009 ). Controlling for relevant variables and using appropriate multivariate statistical methodology, this research documents that the national tendency toward markets-oriented fi nancing systems increases with political stability, societal openness, and economic inequality and decreases with regulatory quality and aversion to ambiguity.
Conclusion
We show that a country's preference for bank-or marketsbased fi nancing is associated with the culture's tolerance for ambiguity. Cultures that are less comfortable with ambiguity are more likely to rely on bank-oriented fi nancing systems. We connect these fi ndings to fundamental aspects of markets and banks. Markets involve contracts that largely rely on impersonal trust rather than collateral. In cultures more adverse to uncertainty, trust in such contracts is more costly to establish.
Knowledge of the factors that make a country bank-or markets-oriented is important to policymakers in all countries, but particularly for policymakers in countries where the fi nancial system is still very much in evolution. Further, managers of multinational companies must take an interest in the fi nancial aspects of their host environments.
Overall, insights into how culture shapes fi nancial outcomes and institutions can help form perspectives in contexts and ways not necessarily foreseen-much as fundamental science leads to new developments in engineering that are not easily predicted. This knowledge can form a background of understanding as policymakers, multinational companies, international banks, and global portfolio managers shape strategic plans and regulations. Footnote 1. However, there is uncertainty regarding the relative infl uence of culture versus institutions, as current institutions can be seen as path-dependent outcomes of cultural infl uences and historical events, and at the same time institutions are seen to infl uence culture (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015 Material may be reprinted if the source is credited. Please send copies of reprinted material to the editor at the address above.
